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Abstract
The central resource processed by the sensorimotor system of an organism is information. We propose an information-
based quantity that allows one to characterize the efficiency of the perception-action loop of an abstract organism model. It
measures the potential of the organism to imprint information on the environment via its actuators in a way that can be
recaptured by its sensors, essentially quantifying the options available and visible to the organism. Various scenarios
suggest that such a quantity could identify the preferred direction of evolution or adaptation of the sensorimotor loop of
organisms.
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Introduction
In view of the richness and complexity of behaviour of living
organisms, one is interested in formulating basic principles that
guide adaptive behaviour in organisms. Virtually any decision by a
living organism involves the processing of information. Thus,
information (in the quantitative sense of Shannon, which we
assume throughout the paper) is increasingly being identified as a
key property and resource in biological organisms.
A basic formulation of this principle is the Law of Requisite Variety
[1,2]. Links between neural complexity and information have been
identified [3,4], and recent work aims at modelling the
information processing throughout the perception-action loop of
agents [5–11].
The hypothesis that quantitative informational principles play an
important role is supported by mounting quantitative evidence that
organisms are investing a considerable amount of metabolic energy
to acquire or process information [12–18] A further link in a more
concrete setting is provided by recent models which indicate the
existence of Bayesian inference mechanisms in the brain which are, in
turn, directly driven by a free energy principle [19].
Information is relevant for finding food, navigation, and
learning from experience and different types of communication
[20,21]. It has been hypothesized that organisms would derive a
selective advantage by optimizing the organization of their sensory
and neural information processing according to suitable informa-
tional criteria [22–25]. The criterion of information optimization
provides a biologically plausible structuring power [26–28] and
could provide significant constraints on the possible structure and
dynamics of sensorimotor loops of viable organisms arising from
the process of evolution and development.
A particular interest lies in studying how structured behaviours
in organisms can emerge under the comparatively sparse feedback
provided by evolutionary selection. Typical for the modelling of
appropriate self-motivated learning and adaptation mechanisms is
the absence of an explicit external goal.
Homeostasis and its generalizations have been proposed to
model such mechanisms [29,30], including information-theoretical
criteria such as predictive information [31,32]. In addition,
relevant criteria have been generally motivated by the ‘‘flow’’
idea to find a suitable balance between surprise, challenge and
predictability, from the fields of psychology [33], machine learning
[34–36] and related fields [37,38]. A central observation is the
importance of embodiment for the emergence of intelligent
behaviour [39].
In the present paper, we investigate an information-theoretic
quantity, empowerment, as a hypothetical candidate for a possible
optimality principle behind the evolution and development of
sensorimotor loops. We explore the plausibility of this hypothesis
in a set of different scenarios, involving the discovery of
‘‘interesting’’ world states, simple homeostatic control, the
evolution of a sensor, and the emergence of context concepts in
a Sony AIBO robot, all arising from the same principle.
Methods
We study empowerment, an information-theoretic utility function
which is universal in the sense that it is independent from a specific
external task and derives solely from the properties of the
perception-action loop of an organism or agent and its interaction
with the environment. Empowerment was introduced in its
context-free form in [40]. It measures the capacity of the agent
to influence the world in a way that this influence is perceivable via
the agent’s sensors. Concretely, we define empowerment as the
maximum amount of information that an agent could send from
its actuators to its sensors via the environment, reducing in the
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simplest case to the external information channel capacity of the
channel from the actuators to the sensors of the agent. For a more
general consideration, empowerment needs to be formulated using
the perception-action loop and information flow formalism from
[5,9,41] based on the framework of Causal Bayesian Networks
[42]. We are looking for a principle that would, in absence of
overwhelming imprinted drives, provide natural behaviour
preferences that might contribute to modulate pre-imprinted
drives or help constituting generic homeostatic variables.
The study of such quantities is motivated by the ability of
organisms to select, from a large variety of possible behaviours
those that help them survive and adapt in a hostile world where a
single wrong action can lead to death. While one can expect
evolution to create biases towards certain types of behaviours, still
the populations available to the search process of biological
evolution are finite and often remarkably small compared to the
space of possible behaviours. An individual agent or an agent
population can attempt and explore only a small fraction of
possible behaviours during its lifetime.
However, the environment in which organisms have to prevail
is not random, but intricately structured. Different kinds of models
have been devised to capture this structure (e.g. [43]). Neverthe-
less, the existing domains differ significantly depending on
complexity, niche and embodiment of the organisms considered.
The present paper suggests that it could be possible to formulate
utility functions which are both universal and local: universal in the
sense that they are determined for different scenarios and agents in
a unified way and that they are relevant to a wide range of
scenarios, species, and ecological niches; local in the sense that
they are derived for agent states only inside a limited time horizon
from the current one, and thus able to provide swift feedback
about the utility of the present state.
If candidates for such universal utilities could be shown to exist,
they could provide organisms with a ‘‘guide’’ for survival-relevant
behaviour wherever more specific drives have not (yet) been
established. During evolution such quantities may then ‘‘crystal-
lize’’ into specialized established drives if they turn out to be
relevant. This then may provide a principle that helps to discover
relevant drives in evolution and development.
If one considers specific utility measures in various (including
biological) scenarios such as the nutrient concentration around a
bacterium, the social status of a chimpanzee in a group, or the
money in a bank account of a person, they have in common that
they quantify the options available to an organism or agent. In
Gibson’s ecological approach where an agent views its environ-
ment through perceptions and actions only [44], this can be
interpreted as the actions that an agent can perform and whose
outcome it can perceive through its sensors.
Under this perspective, we suggest using a generalized measure
of mobility as universal utility; mobility is known from game-
theoretical scenarios as the number of distinct actions that an
agent can select in a given situation. It counts the options of an
agent. Mobility is known as a powerful heuristic for a number of
strategy games (e.g. in the board game of Othello [45]). Also the
previously given examples of specific utility functions can be
interpreted in terms of mobility. To a sugar-feeding bacterium,
high sugar concentration means longer survival time and hence
more possibilities to move to promising locations and a higher
chance for reproduction, to a chimpanzee higher social status
means more mating choices and interaction, to a person more
money means more opportunities and more options.
All above examples comprise a drive towards states providing
more options, i.e. with more potential for control or influence. To
capture this notion quantitatively as a proper utility function, we
quantify the control an organism or agent has over its
environment. In the spirit of Gibson’s ecological approach, this
control is measured with respect to what the agent can actually
observe.
To cast this into a precise quantitative framework, we use the
language of information theory. We measure how much an agent
can do and perceive to be doing by measuring how much information
the agent can inject into the environment and recapture via its
own sensors. Importantly, the information an agent injects into the
environment is viewed solely in the light of what it can perceive
itself, and we distinguish this from what other agents or an all-
knowing observer would detect. The concept of ‘‘the environ-
ment’’ becomes thus a by-product of the interplay between the
agent’s sensors, actuators, and morphology. The utility function
we envisage becomes an intrinsic property of the individual agent’s
perception-action loop [46]. We suggest that this quantity,
empowerment, is a natural candidate for a universal utility and
investigate its properties in a representative selection of scenarios.
Context-Free Empowerment
Empowerment quantifies the agent’s potential ability to influence
the environment as measured by the capacity to ‘‘imprint’’
information onto the environment and later perceive the
information via the sensors. To measure this potential it is
necessary to disregard the actual behaviour of the agent and to
model how the agent could behave in principle (disregarding the
actual behaviour of the agent can be imagined as removing the
agent’s controller and studying the remaining ‘‘empty shell’’ which
is the agent’s body).
To do this, we formulate empowerment in an interventional
framework based on causal Bayesian networks [42,9]. Here, we
require the tracking of maximum potential information flow through
the system. This is complicated by the fact that Shannon
information is not additive. Therefore, for the purposes of
quantifying empowerment we provide the agent with an unlimited
source of unique randomness, i.e. which is uncorrelated with
anything else in the system. This allows us to track its flow through
the system since, wherever correlation (i.e., mutual information) is
found with the uncorrelated source, it must have flowed there from
that source (an approach to measure actual - as opposed to
potential - information flow is given in [41]).
The model is based on the causal Bayesian network model of
the perception-action loop of an agent in an environment [5,9].
To define the concept of empowerment in terms of a maximum
potential information flow, we first consider the simplest case of
the perception-action loop of an agent where the action selection
has been disconnected from the sensor input and is made
independently from it, specifically through the source of unique
randomness. We measure then how much information can at most
be sent through the environment from the actuators.
Figure 1 shows the corresponding Bayesian network:
At,Atz1,Atz2 are random variables denoting the agent’s action
at time t,tz1,tz2, analogously St,Stz1,Stz2 denote the agent’s
sensor states and Rtz1,Rtz2,Rtz3 the state of the environment at
the corresponding times, and Zt the source of independent
randomness, by which actions are selected. In the Bayesian
network formalism, each arrow is to be interpreted such that the
variable depends only on the probability conditional conditioning
of the target random variable on the variables at the origin of its
incoming arrows; for instance Rtz2 depends on the other
preceding variables only according p rtz2jatz1,rtz1ð Þ; in our
model, we interpret the arrows more strongly as actual causal
mechanisms, not just as observed probability conditionals [42].
Keep Your Options Open
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To measure empowerment, we are interested in maximizing the
information flow that the actuators can transmit to the sensors at a
later time step. For instance, if we consider 3-step empowerment in
Fig. 1, we are interested in asking how much information could be
potentially generated via actuations At,Atz1,Atz2f g:A3t and
sent to the sensor Stz3 via the environment. This is measured by
maximizing the information flow over all independent ‘‘free will’’
distributions p at,atz1,atz2ð Þ over the actions. To make clear in
the Bayesian network formalism that we perform the maximiza-
tion over a joint distribution of actions, we introduce Zt as a joint
ancestor over the actions in question.
We thus obtain n-step empowerment as
Ant?Stzn
 
~ max
p at,...,atzn{1ð Þ
I At, . . . ,Atzn{1;Stznð Þ, ð1Þ
under the Bayesian network from Fig. 1. For random variables of
finite size (which we assume throughout), this quantity can be
computed by standard channel capacity optimization algorithms.
For this purpose, the causal effect of the actions on the sensor
values has to be measured.
The causal effect can be measured in general by using
independent random actions to probe independent samples of
the channel or by computing the full Bayesian model for the
channel. However, under certain conditions it can even be
attained without probing or intervention, using only observational
data with the help of Pearl’s interventional calculus [42]. A useful
special case of this is given in Appendix S4; it includes scenarios
where the whole system state at successive time steps can be
observed, such as is the case e.g. in simulations. Once the causal
effect is known, the channel capacity is computed directly using
the algorithm of Blahut [51].
Note that the quantity from (1) is open-loop as it does not utilize
feedback from sensor inputs after t to select its actions. Rather, the
actuation distribution is selected ‘‘blindly’’. It is possible to
generalize the approach to utilize feedback, though the compu-
tation becomes more intricate. Similarly, one could consider
interleaved variants of empowerment where one considers a
sequence of sensor readouts Stzn’,Stzn’z1, . . . where n’vn, i.e.
the readouts begin before the actuations are over. This will,
however, not play a role in the following discussion.
Note that the time horizon n captures the foresight of the
empowerment measure under the influence of the agent’s
actions. Only features of the environment that can be reached
by the actions inside this time horizon are detected by the
measure. If the environment is relatively homogeneous and
limited, empowerment grows only slowly with the horizon; for
instance, in a fully observable deterministic finite-dimensional
grid world, empowerment grows only logarithmically with n, but
any inhomogeneity (such as a locally increased set of options, e.g.
induced by the presence of an object that can be manipulated by
the agent) reached by the growing horizon is detected by a jump
in the empowerment value [40].
Contextual Empowerment
The previous section assumes that the environmental states
from which the agent starts when measuring the empowerment
are distributed according to some given probability. It does not
distinguish these states in the empowerment calculation. As
opposed to that, consider now for a moment the agent’s
empowerment when starting in different specific states. One finds
that, in general, empowerment as well as the action distribution for
which it is achieved varies from state to state. In this case the
action distribution which maximizes information flow can vary for
each individual state, and thus this state-specific empowerment is
never smaller (but in general larger) than the empowerment value
from last section which was calculated for a global distribution
over the states.
Formulating this state-specific empowerment implies access to
‘‘objective’’ state information. As opposed to that, one could
consider the empowerment value attainable under the weaker
condition of ‘‘subjective’’ information which is limited to the
agent’s sensoric history or part thereof. The advantage of the latter
is that it would be, at least in principle, available to the agent itself.
Both ‘‘objective’’ as well as ‘‘subjective’’ variants of empowerment
will be considered in the paper; if the agent sensor has access to full
state information, they coincide. And both are important special
cases of the more general concept of contextual empowerment
which we proceed to define in the following.
Define a context, denoted with a random variable C, as a
collection of random variables from the causal Bayesian network
which are non-descendants of the variables in Ant (and Zt). Define
the empowerment given a context C, denoted by Ant?Stzn Cj
 
, as
the average empowerment when context C~c is observed,
weighted by the probability of observing a particular realization
of the context:
Ant?StznjC
 
~
X
c[C
p cð Þ: Ant?StznjC~c
 
: ð2Þ
This can be interpreted as the channel capacity with side
information known to the sender (actuators) and the receiver
(sensors) [47]. Observing the context never decreases the non-
context maximum information flow, since the latter can be treated
as a special case where the side-information is not used:
Figure 1. n-step empowerment as the maximum information flow from the actions At, . . . ,Atzn{1f g:Ant to a sensory input variable St’
at time step t’wt. The maximization occurs over the joint distribution of the actions (indicated by the common parent Zt). The sensor input that the
agent itself perceives later is shown in the top row of the diagram as it is detached from the action selection used for empowerment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004018.g001
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Ant?StznjC
 
§ Ant?Stzn
 
: ð3Þ
The world information that an agent itself can access to increase
its contextual empowerment is filtered through the sensors and, in
general, limited. The most informative context for the agent would
be the global state Rt; if that is not available, the next best context
consists of the sequence of actions and the sensor inputs
St,At{1,St{1,At{2, . . .ð Þ going into the past. This history of the
agent’s interaction with its environment constitutes an upper limit
on what the agent can possibly know about the momentary state of
the world.
The state space of such a history, however, can become
extremely large. Therefore, for more practically relevant situations
we will propose the construction of a context automaton, a finite state
machine with limited memory, denoted again with a random
variable C, from empirical data. Its purpose is to provide an
approximative context for contextual empowerment. At each time
step the action At taken and the resulting sensor input Stz1 are fed
into the automaton. One now searches for an automaton which
incrementally and efficiently filters and compresses the history of
the agent’s interaction with the environment in a way that the state
C of the automaton, used as a context for empowerment, yields a
maximum increase of the contextual empowerment over the
context-free case. We will use such a construction as a context
automaton. Context automata are a generalization of the concept
of e-machines [48,49], parametrising the state transitions via freely
selectable actions.
The efficiency of the context automaton found can be evaluated
internally by the agent: it is the difference between the contextual
empowerment and the context-free empowerment. Both quantities
can be estimated without referring to any variables ‘‘outside’’ of
the agent and allow a fully ‘‘internalized’’ formulation of a context
automaton which can be found in an unsupervised way.
Results
We now adopt empowerment as a utility defined for each state
(context) of an agent and study how it shapes the agent’s state
space. As a utility, we consider empowerment as guiding the
agent to particular preferred states, either by internal behaviours
of the agent or by external pressures (say, evolution). Note that if
empowerment maximization is to be achieved by the agent’s
internal behaviours, the agent needs to keep track of its context.
We argue that empowerment provides a natural a priori utility
function for an agent by studying a variety of disparate scenarios.
While there is nothing special in applying specially designed utility
functions to optimize the behaviour of an agent with respect to a
task, empowerment is universal in the sense that it is always, no
matter what the scenario, defined in the same way via the
sensorimotor loop of the agent in its environment. In other words,
for a given perception-action loop and environment, empower-
ment systematically induces natural preferred states and, conse-
quently, (as we see in the pole-balancing scenario below)
behaviours. Universality is a key property of any viable model of
self-motivated or task-independent organism behaviour. In the
philosophy of universal utilities, any more specific task-dependence
sits on top of these natural tasks or ultimately emerges from them.
In [40], it has been shown that empowerment as a utility is
consistent with specialized measures of favourable system states
and that it also attracts an agent e.g. to world states where
manipulable objects are present in simple grid worlds. Here, we
consider several more intricate and relevant scenarios, beginning
with pole balancing.
A Pole-Balancing Scenario
A central claim is that empowerment strives towards states and
behaviours one would intuitively classify as ‘‘interesting’’ and
‘‘challenging’’. To investigate this, we study a simple continuous
dynamic task. Pole-balancing on a cart is a classical task from
control theory widely used as a simple testbed for various control
or learning algorithms. We use this well-known continuous model
as it is intuitive and easy to relate to the results. In this section, we
compute empowerment for the state space of the pole-cart system
and investigate the behaviour that results from local empowerment
maximization.
The pole-cart system consists of a wheeled cart that moves along
a straight and level track. A pole is hinged to the top of the cart. A
force can be applied to the cart, pushing it one way or the other
along the track. Conventionally, the goal is explicitly given and
consists in applying (or learning to apply) the force as to keep the
pole close to vertical. Here, however, we instead use only
empowerment as the utility to be maximized by the behaviour
of the system. Note that, once the system dynamics, as well as
actuators and sensors are given, empowerment is defined in the
usual, universal, way. Beyond that, no system-specific goal is given,
in particular no indication of the task that one intuitively expects to
be solved.
The pole-cart system is described by the cart’s position x, the
cart’s speed
:
x~ dx
dt
, the pole’s angle from the upright position h
(clockwise), and the angular speed of the pole
:
h~ dh
dt
. The variables
are related as following:
d2h
dt2
~
g sin h{a cos h{mp
:
h2l cos h sin h
l 4
3
{mpcos
2h
  ,where ð4Þ
a~
F
mpzmc
,and ð5Þ
mp~
mp
mpzmc
; ð6Þ
d2x
dt2
~
4
3
az 4
3
:
h2l{g cos h
 
mp sin h
4
3
{mp cos
2h
  : ð7Þ
We use the constants given in Table 1 for our experiments. The
Euler integration method with step size t is used for updating the
state of the system through time. Although this method is
imprecise and unstable [50], we employ the method for
consistency because it is commonly used in the majority of
treatments of the pole-balancing problem. In any case, we do not
expect the essence of the results to significantly depend on the
precision of the integration method.
With the Euler integration, the state of the system at simulation
time step tz1 depends on the previous state at time step t as
following:
xtz1~xtzt
:
xt ð8Þ
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:
xtz1~
:
xt{t
d2x
dt2
tð Þ ð9Þ
htz1~htzt
:
ht ð10Þ
:
htz1~
:
ht{t
d2h
dt
tð Þ: ð11Þ
If hj j§ p
2
, then h is clipped to either respective boundary{ p
2
or
p
2
, and
:
h is set to 0 – after falling onto the cart, the pole cannot
continue falling further. Note that for simplicity and consistency
with the diagrams such as Fig. 1, t denotes just the time index step,
not an absolute time measured in time intervals t.
Consider an agent which can apply force to the cart, and can
observe the results. We now study how the agent’s empowerment
depends on the state of the pole-cart system.
Available to the agent is the action of applying the force F or2F
to the cart. Each action lasts for the time 3t and the force is kept
constant during that time. Assume that, starting at time step 0, the
agent performs a sequence of 10 actions, denoted by a random
variable A100 . After this sequence of ten actions the agent observes
part of the state of the system, namely the angle of the pole
S10~H10. To calculate empowerment, the angle variable H10 is
discretised into 101 equal bins ( hj jƒ p
2
rad). Using this model, we
will calculate open A
10
0 ?S10
 
for different initial states of the
system.
The system dynamics is sensitive to initial conditions. Therefore,
instead of initial states concentrated on one point, we need to
consider slightly perturbed ensembles of starting points to obtain
representative trajectory distributions. For an initial state
c~ x0,
:
x0,h0,
:
h0
 
the ensemble consists of 54 states uniformly
distributed around the state in the 4-cube with side
0:002 : x0z0:001a,
:
x0z0:001b,h0z0:001c,
:
h0z0:001d
 
,
where a,b,c,d[{2,{1,0,1,2. This ensemble is then used compute
the causal effect p s10ja^100 ,c
 
by obtaining p s10ja100 ,c
 
for each of
the 210 action sequences. Open-loop empowerment
open A
10
0 ?S10 C~cj
 
is then computed from the causal effect
as the channel capacity of the channel A100 ?S10 characterized by
p s10ja^100 ,c
 
. The capacity is found with a precision of 1024 bit
using the iterative algorithm by Blahut [51].
Figure 2 shows how empowerment depends on the initial angle
h0 when the other three system variables start at zero. There is an
abrupt cutoff angle after which empowerment drops to zero. If the
pole starts at more than the critical angle from the vertical, the
applied force is not enough to influence the pole’s final position
after 10 time steps — the pole falls regardless of the agent’s
actions. The small deviations from monotonic growth of
Figure 2. Empowerment open A
10
0 ?S10 H0~h0j ,
:
H0~0,X0~0,
:
X 0~0
 
for 1001 equispaced initial angular deviations of the pole from
the vertical: h0[ { p2 ;
p
2
 
rad.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004018.g002
Table 1. Parameters to the dynamics of the pole-cart system.
Parameter Value
Gravitational acceleration (g) {9:81 m:s{2
Length of half of the pole (l) 0.5 m
Mass of the cart (mc) 1 kg
Mass of the pole (mp) 0.1 kg
Control force (F) 10 N
Integration time step (d) 0.02 s
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004018.t001
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empowerment as one moves towards h0~0 are not just due to
sampling error but also likely to partly arise from branching points
in the dynamics of the system.
If only the initial angle is varied while the other variables are
fixed to zero, then empowerment is highest for h0~0, i.e. for a
pole that starts vertically. This corresponds to the intuitive and
natural upright target state of conventional learning tasks.
Interestingly, the full picture becomes more intricate if we allow
the initial angular speed also to be varied. In that case, h0~0 is no
longer the state with maximum empowerment and, as Fig. 3
shows, there exist states away from h0~0 with slightly larger
empowerment (by 0.07 bit). These ‘‘off-centre’’ states correspond
to a pole which is leaning to one side, but which has an angular
speed that would quickly turn it towards the upright position (and
ultimately beyond). The results show that this special constellation
allows the system to reach a (slightly) larger variety of states in
n~10 action steps than the upright pole with zero angular speed.
This saddle-point property is robust with respect to the variation of
parameters of the cart-pole system. However, it depends on
including the cart in the model, as the effect disappears in a pure
pole-control scenario (without cart and with only torque control at
the base of the pole).
Thus, if we would selectively poise the system in these states, it is
these off-centre states that would turn out to have the highest
empowerment (which is not immediately expected). However,
once the system itself is required to attain maximum empower-
ment states, the situation changes.
In fact, it turns out that above ‘‘off-centre’’ maximum
empowerment states are unreachable through the intrinsic
dynamics of the agent: while one can externally set up the initial
state carefully to start in these states, it is not possible to devise an
internal action strategy that is able to reach them under the given
actuator dynamics. These states are similar to Garden of Eden
states (i.e. states with no predecessor) in dynamical systems in the
sense the agent has no way to reach these ‘‘off-centre’’ maximum
empowerment states by itself in a sustained run under its own
dynamics.
The picture is completed by considering the behaviour of an
agent that is entirely guided by its local n-step empowerment.
Assume that the agent controls the cart-pole system at each time
step as to maximize the 10-step empowerment of the following
state. As before, assume that the only two actions available are
applying the force of either 210 N or 10 N to the cart.
We base the control policy on just the pole’s momentary angle
and angular speed since the control model can be simplified by
transforming the system into one where the cart’s position and
speed are zero. We now consider the control that greedily
maximizes empowerment, as follows: for each combination of the
pole’s angle and angular speed we determine the successor state
that results when each of the available actions 210 N or 10 N are
applied. For each of the possible successor states we determine the
10-step empowerment. The greedy controller then selects that
action that results in the successor state with the highest expected
empowerment. Figure 4 shows the resulting action selection policy.
When the system is run under this greedy policy of
empowerment maximization, it turns out that the system indeed
performs classic pole-balancing (note that this works also on a
moving cart since the dynamics of the system is invariant to
constant velocity shifts). There is an expected and a less expected
aspect to this observation: on the one hand, a priori pole-
balancing appears to be an intuitive and natural task in the cart-
pole system. It coincides with a high level of options available to
Figure 3. Contour plot of empowerment open A
10
0 ?S10 H0~h0j ,
:
H0~
:
h0,X0~0,
:
X 0~0
 
as a function of the initial angle h0 and the initial
angular speed
:
h0 when the initial position and the speed of the cart are 0. Obtained for 3016301 equispaced initial positions h0,
:
h0
 
.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004018.g003
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the agent by the pole being poised in the unstable upright
position.
However, note that, on the other hand, empowerment is, while
quite close to the maximum, not strictly maximal at the upright
position h~0,
:
h~0
 
, as we have seen in Fig. 3, since there exist
higher empowered states. These are however excluded by the
combination of the condition of a continuous running system
constraining the states which can be reached and reliably
maintained over time with the greedy policy for empowerment
maximization. Together, they manage to ultimately reduce the
dynamics to the fundamental pole-balancing problem. The ‘‘off-
centre’’ states that would theoretically maximize empowerment
cannot be realized nor sustained.
Furthermore, it should be noted that this greedy policy is local
in the following sense: there is a one step look-ahead on which
action selection will maximize 10-step empowerment, and the 10-
step empowerment has a look-ahead of 10 time steps, so the policy
has a local time horizon of 1+10 steps. However, there is no
‘‘overarching plan’’ to balance the pole. This global behaviour
emerges purely from the local empowerment-maximizing dynam-
ics of the system (this can be compared to the globalistic structure
of reinforcement learning models where not only the agent
rewards have to be explicitly designed, but where they also
essentially have to be propagated throughout the system to all
states [52]).
Again, it should be noted that there was no scenario-specific
hand-crafted task to balance the pole. The complete behaviour
derives from the generically formulated empowerment-maxi-
mizing policy, defined exactly same way as it would be for any
other system under consideration. We will highlight possible
implications of this property for homeostatic dynamics in the
Discussion.
Empowerment-Driven Evolution of Sensorimotor
Apparatus
While artificial systems typically have fixed sensors and
actuators, in biology these evolve over time and cannot be
assumed to stay unchanged. The evolution of sensors and the
sensorimotor loop has been hypothesized to be an important
driver of evolution [53]. An organism’s sensorimotor loop
contributes significantly to its success.
The question emerges whether it would be possible to quantify
the advantageous contribution of a particular sensorimotor loop
more immediately than can be achieved by the delayed
evolutionary feedback via selection. The importance of informa-
tion discussed earlier in the Introduction indicates that it could be
expected to be suitably correlated with an overarching fitness
advantage [54,55,56,18].
We now use empowerment to immediately measure the quality
of a perception-action loop and feed it directly as a fitness criterion
into a simple artificial evolution model. Any further constraints on
the agents are summarily captured by constraining the possible
structure and informational bandwidth of sensors and actuators.
This experiment extends earlier results from [56] and studies the
nature of the qualitative change of the resulting sensoric
morphologies as experimental conditions are gradually modified.
To apply empowerment in this scenario, one should note that it
strongly depends on the causal effect of the agent’s actions on the
future sensor input. The causal effect (for a brief definition of
causal effect, see Appendix S3 or, for a detailed exposition, see
[42]) is a function of the sensory mechanism p st r^t
  and the
actuatoric mechanism p rtz1 r^t,
 a^t
 
which can be interpreted as a
description of the agent’s embodiment: a description of how the
agent’s sensors and actuators interact with the environment. Thus
a way of modifying empowerment is to modify these mechanisms.
Figure 4. Action selection policy for maintaining high expected empowerment as a function of the angle h and the angular speed
:
h
of the pole. Obtained for 3016301 equispaced states. In the areas marked with ‘‘10 N ’’ and ‘‘{10 N ’’ the corresponding action should be chosen,
whereas in the two areas marked with neither of the actions can prevent the pole from eventually falling.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004018.g004
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Depending on the concrete scenario, this can be realized as a
modification of the environment, the agent’s morphology and
actuators, the agent’s sensors, or all of them.
This section illustrates the idea specifically by evolving sensors
and actuators of an agent for different locations (i.e. contexts) in a
simulated world. Note that empowerment can be considered to
provide local and immediate feedback to the evolutionary
dynamics — our present evaluation is based on the short-term
value of empowerment rather than some longer-term delayed
fitness measure such as the survival of the agent in the
environment.
Consider an infinite two-dimensional square grid world. A
source is located at the centre of the grid. The source emits a
signal, the strength P of which in any cell of the grid is P dð Þ~d{2,
P 0ð Þ~2, where d is the Cartesian distance from the source.
An agent moves in the world occupying one cell at a time. The
sensor model consists of a number of detectors at fixed positions
relative to the agent. Each of these detectors samples the strength
of the signal P their position around the agent. The sensor then
identifies the one with highest strength. If several detectors
measure a maximal signal, the tie-breaker is to pick one at
random, with uniform probability. The available repertoire of
detectors around the agent will be varied according to the scenario
below.
Similarly to the detectors, the agent has a given repertoire of
actions. An action is a jump of the agent into a cell relative to the
agent (not necessarily just neighbouring cells). In addition, the
agent can choose as action not to move at all. We shall now
present two complementary scenarios: evolving a sensor for a
given actuator, and evolving an actuator for a given sensor.
Assume that the agent’s actuator has a fixed repertoire of just
five actions: stay in the current cell or move into one of the four
adjacent cells south, east, north and west (von Neumann
neighbourhood). We now investigate the best layout of the sensor
detectors so that the agent’s n-step empowerment is maximal.
For the experiment, we constrain the set of sensors to those
finding the cell with highest signal strength near the agent. As
mentioned above, each sensor is modelled as a set of sampling
points (detectors) arranged relative to the agent. For example, a
sensor measuring the local gradient surrounding the agent using
the von Neumann neighbourhood consists of four sampling
points:{(0, 21), (1, 0), (0, 1), (21, 0)}, denoting the cells directly
south, east, north and west of the agent to be sampled.
To find good sensors we search in the set of sensors using an
evolutionary algorithm. The algorithm treats each sensor layout as
an individual. The sampling points of any sensor are constrained
to lie within a fixed square with side b around the agent. The
maximum number of sampling points a sensor can have is fixed.
At any point in time, the returned state of a sensor identifies that
sampling point which measures the highest signal strength. Hence,
the number of sampling points is also the number of states of the
sensor Sj j.
We define the fitness F of a sensor as the 4-step open-loop
empowerment
4
0~ open A
4
0?S4
 
of the agent equipped with
the sensor. The fitness also includes a small penalty for the number
Sj j of sampling points used:
F~ 40{e Sj j, ð12Þ
where we set e~10{3. The penalty serves to select, among
essentially equivalent sensors those which are more economical
and have fewer sampling points. The exact value of the penalty
used here is arbitrary, though small.
The fitness of a sensor is evaluated for a particular initial
position of the agent in the world (for instance, the centre which is
at (0,0) in Cartesian coordinates). The required (interventional)
conditional probability distribution p s4 a^
4
0
  that describes the
resulting state s4 of the sensor at the fourth time step after carrying
out the four actions is calculated exactly from the Bayesian
network [42]. The 4-step open-loop empowerment is then the
capacity of this channel characterized by the interventional
probability distribution. The capacity is found with 1024 bit
precision using the iterative algorithm by Blahut [51].
We initialize the population with five randomly generated
sensors. In every generation, the five best sensors produce five
offspring each. The size of the population is between 5 and 30.
Five best individuals from the parents and offspring are selected
into the next generation.
An offspring is produced from its parent by mutation. The
mutation operator supports two operations: (1) addition of a
sampling point, and (2) deletion of an existing sampling point. If
the sensor has no sampling points, the mutation operator always
adds a point. If the sensor has the maximum number of sampling
points, the mutation operator always deletes a point. Otherwise,
either a new point is added or an existing one is deleted with equal
probability.
To speed up the search and make it more efficient we have
incorporated ideas from simulated annealing and tabu search: (1)
the number of mutations performed is uniformly distributed
between 1 and 1z G mod10ð Þ,where G is the generation number;
and (2) we do not add offspring which have been evaluated before
or are already present in the population. To sample the solution
space thoroughly we run the evolutionary algorithm at least 10
times for 1000 generations each. The best individuals are selected
across these runs.
We have evolved the sensor for different positions of the agent
in the world to illustrate how empowerment makes sensors and
actuators adapt to the niche in which the agent exists. We have
constrained the sensor to a maximum of 20 sampling points which
lie inside the square with side length 21 centred around the agent.
Figure 5 shows the best evolved sensors for different starting
positions of the agent. The positions shown begin with the agent at
the centre (denoted by distance 0 to the centre), as well as
displaced to the east by 1, 2, …, 20 cells. The artificial evolution
found essentially two qualitatively distinct types of sensors. For an
agent located near the signal source (up to a distance of 11 cells)
the sensors form nearly two-dimensional ‘‘blobs’’ which capture
more or less the absolute displacement from the source. However,
for the areas further away from the source (12 cells and more), the
sensors change character and collapse into roughly one-dimen-
sional circular segments centred approximately at the source and
which only capture the bearing to the source. This phenomenon
appears consistently also for other displacement directions (not
shown here), not only for vertical ones which are equivalent to the
horizontal ones due to symmetry, but also diagonal ones.
In earlier experiments investigating agent displacements
Dx,Dyð Þ from the centre [57], it turns the best sensor layouts for
starting positions (20,0), (10,10), (20,10), and (20,20) are stable in
the sense that, if the evolutionary experiment is repeated, the
resulting solutions remain almost exactly the same. Common to
these positions was that they are relatively far away from the
centre. Evolved sensor layouts for agents closer to the centre, e.g.
(0,0) and (10,0), are much more prone to variations while retaining
exactly the same empowerment and hence fitness. This suggests
that these solutions belonged to a plateau of the fitness landscape
that allows for some significant variety of optimal solutions.
Qualitatively, though, these layouts still consisted approximately of
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a blob of sampling points. The blob was typically centred at the
agent for the (0,0) starting position, and on the far left for the
(10,0), essentially covering the centre of the gradient field.
We now inspected the population of the evolutionary algorithm
more closely. This revealed that even in a distance d up to 11 from
the centre individuals with arced sensors can already be found in
the evolved population. However, with their smaller empower-
ment value, they are inferior to the blob sensors which constitute
the best solutions in this case. As d grows beyond 11, the advantage
of the blob sensors vanishes and the arced solutions start
dominating. This indicates a replacement of one major solution
niche by another on approximately continuous change of the
parameter d and this, in turn, a phenomenon analogous to a phase
transition in the transformation of the blob into the arc.
Since in the discussion we will return to this sensor evolution
scenario in a broader context, we briefly conclude the section by
mentioning the results from [57] concerning the complementary
task of evolving actuators which maximize empowerment for a
fixed sensor. Apart from that, that experiment was similar to the
sensor evolution experiment described above. The main observa-
tion was that, unlike the sensors, the evolved optimal actuators
exhibited a significant variety.
Summarizing, this section demonstrates that empowerment can
serve as an immediate guide for sensor and actuator evolution. In
particular, using empowerment as a fitness function allows
evolution to implicitly switch from one qualitative representation
of information to another one, namely from a ‘‘blob’’ sensor
measuring an absolute displacement vs. a bearing sensor in the
sensor evolution experiment. The switching was emphatically not
designed into the model but emerged through the empowerment
optimization and via a discontinuous shift from one solution niche
to another in the manner of a phase transition. In the Discussion,
we will present possible insights this may provide into the
abundance of sensory modalities in nature.
Relevant Contexts Induced by Empowerment
When considering contextual empowerment, we noted that, if a
context helps increase empowerment, then we expect the context
to be sharing information with the global state of the system. This
makes it possible for an agent to obtain an intrinsic meta-sensor for
features in the global state of the system that are relevant to
empowerment, purely by constructing a suitable context which
increases empowerment.
In this section we illustrate this idea using a hardware robot, the
Sony AIBO. The intention is to demonstrate that empowerment,
while being a completely intrinsic function, can be used to construct
contexts which correspond to external concepts, and can thus
assign an analogy of ‘‘meaning’’ [58–60] to the robot’s actions.
We use an AIBO ERS-210A robot dog. The robot is lying on a
desk (Fig. 6). We employ only one type of action, namely setting
the robot head’s tilt to a value in [21;1], and concentrate
exclusively on the infra-red (IR) sensor mounted in the head of the
robot and pointing along the longitudinal axis of the head. The
sensor measures the distance to an obstacle in front of the head.
The effective range is below 1 m. Moreover, the sensor is noisy, for
example, because of the reflections from the table.
In this experiment the AIBO performs a randomly chosen
action (set the head’s tilt to a randomly and uniformly chosen
value in [21;1]) every two seconds, and at the end of the two
second period, just before performing a new action, the IR sensor
reading is captured (the interval of two seconds is long enough for
the effect of an action to be independent of any previous actions.
This is to simplify the experiment for proof-of-concept purposes).
Every 200 actions a book is placed in front of the robot for 100
actions and then removed. The experiment lasts for 1000 actions.
Based on the captured data we calculate the average
empowerment by choosing a quantization of the actions and the
sensor inputs (see below for details). We base the empowerment
function on the effect of an action on the IR sensor 2 seconds later.
Empowerment is increased by the knowledge of whether the book
is present in front of the robot or not, because the causal effect of
an action on the sensor depends on the presence of the book in
front of the robot. The increase is different for different
combinations of the quantizations of action and sensory input.
In this experiment we distinguish three empowerment quanti-
ties: context-free empowerment – empowerment when no context is
used, book-contextual empowerment – empowerment where the state of
the book (the book is either present or absent) is used as the
context, and controller-contextual empowerment – empowerment where
the state of a suitably constructed context automaton (see the
section introducing contextual empowerment) is used as the
context.
There exists a context (namely, the presence or absence of the
book) that increases contextual empowerment. However, the
question is whether it is actually possible to create a context
automaton which has controller-contextual empowerment that is
Figure 5. A possible phase transition in the layout of best evolved sensors. Best evolved sensors for position d,0ð Þ are shown above, where
d[ 1,2, . . . ,20f g. The transition from clustered to arched layout occurs around d~12.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004018.g005
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higher than the context-free empowerment, and whether the state
of such a context automaton would actually capture information
about the state of the book, thus serving as an indirect sensor for
the presence or absence of the book. Since we designed the
experiment so that the only external factor that would influence
empowerment is the state of the book, we expect this to be the
case.
We address these questions by performing an evolutionary
search to find a two-state context automaton that provides the
highest contextual empowerment and compare the controller-
contextual empowerment of the best automata with the book-
contextual empowerment.
The action (a tilt in the interval [21;1]) and the sensor input (a
distance in the interval [0;1], measured by the infra-red sensor)
two seconds after the action has been taken are quantized into bins
of equal size. The number of bins used for the action quantization
may be different from the number of bins used for the sensor
input. This quantization creates two discrete random variables: the
action A and the sensor input S. The presence or absence of the
book in front of the robot is denoted by a random binary variable
B. The experiment generates a single time series
at,bt,stð Þt~0,1,...,1000 from which all quantities are later calculated.
The underlying causal Bayesian network is A?S/B. The
context-free empowerment A?Sð Þ and the book-contextual empowerment
A?SjBð Þ are calculated from the network using the total joint
distribution p a,s,bð Þ~P999t~0 f At~a,Bt~b,Stz1~sð Þ, with f
denoting the empirical frequencies of the given event combina-
tions a,s,bð Þ.
The context automaton is a deterministic finite-state automaton
with a binary state C and uses the momentary sensor input and
action as input. At each time step t the automaton performs a time-
independent mapping st,at,ctð Þ. ctz1ð Þ. The underlying causal
Bayesian network is similar to the above book-contextual case
except that C is used instead of B : A?S/C. Analogously, we
calculate the controller-contextual empowerment as A?SjCð Þ.
Due to undersampling, the theoretic assumption that C and A
are independent does not hold in general if the context automaton
C is extracted from an empirically sampled finite time series.
Therefore, when evolving context automata (mappings) to
maximize the controller-contextual empowerment, we add a
bottleneck-type penalty term [61] to the empowerment value, and
use the modified expression A?SjCð Þ{bI A;Cð Þ, here with
b= 1, as fitness function. This quantity penalizes the empower-
ment for a violation of the assumption of independence between A
and C. The above fitness function is again calculated from
p a,c,sð Þ~P999t~0 f Ct~c,At~a,Stz1~sð Þ, with f the empirical
frequencies.
We performed an evolutionary search for each combination of
Aj j[2,3, . . . ,15 and Sj j[2,3, . . . ,15 to find a two-state context
automaton with the highest controller-contextual empowerment.
The context-free empowerment for these cases lies in the interval
[0.52;2.03], the book-contextual empowerment in [0.61;2.15], and
the controller-contextual empowerment of the best evolved
controllers in [0.56;2.15]. As a general trend, it turns out that,
whenever there is a significant difference between context-free and
book-contextual empowerment, indeed context automata tend to
be found which achieve a controller-contextual empowerment
close to the book-contextual empowerment (Fig. 7). Thus, the
difference between book-contextual empowerment and the
context-free empowerment can be interpreted as a potential for
evolution to find a context automaton with high controller-
contextual empowerment.
Note that empowerment maximization using the context
automaton evolution leads to contexts corresponding to external
states, even while it only uses intrinsic data available to the robot.
As expected, this only happens when the effect of the robot’s
Figure 6. Setup of the experiment with the AIBO. From left to right the photographs show the minimal, zero, and maximal tilt of the AIBO’s
head.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004018.g006
Figure 7. Empowerment gain (in bits) by a best evolved
context-automaton over the context-free empowerment
( A?SjCð Þ{ A?Sð Þ on the vertical axis) plotted vs. the
difference between book-contextual empowerment and con-
text-free empowerment ( A?SjBð Þ{ A?Sð Þ on the horizon-
tal axis).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004018.g007
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actions on its sensors indeed depends on these external states. The
evolved context automaton is thus able to reconstruct aspects of
these external states. This can be considered as assigning a
rudimentary kind of ‘‘meaning’’ to the agent’s action-selection or
information processing mechanism.
Discussion
We wish to emphasize several salient points of the empower-
ment model. First of all, using empowerment to direct task-
independent behaviour is distinct in a number of relevant aspects
from the other methods suggested for that purpose. For instance,
the autotelic principle [38] or the learning progress [37] require
measures which are to some degree tailored to the problem at
hand and intertwined with the particular learning model. Other
perspectives for self-motivated behaviour range from reinforce-
ment learning, to homeostasis and autopoiesis principles
[35,29,62].
The latter are conceptually closer, as is the homeokinetic
approach [63,64] and a closely related information-theoretic
variant of that method, based on predictive information [32]
which considers maximizing predictive information in the system,
i.e. the information that the sensory past (or a part thereof) of the
agent has about its future. Similarly, other information-theoretic
quantities operating on the system dynamics, and other coordi-
nation measures, as well as excess entropy have been used
successfully to study the generation of intrinsically motivated
behaviour in embodied systems [65,11].
As opposed to these measures, empowerment quantifies (1) a
potential rather than an actual information flow in the system,
probing the ‘‘potentiality space’’ rather than the actual trajectory
as most task-independent functions do; (2), it looks at information
that could be generated specifically by the agent itself and then
injected into the system, rather than information (or entropy,
depending on the perspective from which it is considered) that is
generically produced somewhere in the system.
The fact that empowerment deals with what an agent could do
rather than what it actually does is conceptually a significant
difference to the other models since it implies that empowerment
does not depend on a particular action-selection mechanism or
controller. It derives only from the embodiment, i.e. on how the
agent is linked into the environment. The other approaches
consider the whole system dynamics and link the concrete agent
behaviour directly to their utility measure.
Importantly, in empowerment, the actuatoric dynamics plays a
role that is explicitly conjugate to the sensory dynamics, whereas
most approaches focus on the sensory time series while their
actuatorics is essentially implicit. This is due to the fact that, to
compute empowerment, the perception-action loop is treated in a
fundamentally causal way, in contrast to the other approaches
which limit themselves to observational, correlative measures. The
advantage is that, by this separation of sensors and actuators,
empowerment provides a very transparent measure of the role that
is played specifically by the agent as opposed to its environment.
However, this conceptual clarity comes at a price. The
downside of using empowerment is that, as a causal quantity, it
is significantly more difficult to compute than the other quantities
of this kind. In most of the above experiments, empowerment had
to be computed using a ‘‘detachable’’ world model that allowed to
reposition and retry certain behaviours in a particular situation.
An exception to that was the hardware AIBO scenario for the
discovery of relevant contexts, where however we had to set up the
experiment in a particular way (e.g. waiting for two seconds to
make sure that the effect of an action has taken place) and
combining it with the context automaton evolution to be able to
isolate the causal effect of the actions.
This means that, unlike the other approaches mentioned many
of which operate on-line, it is not straightforward to use
empowerment to generate per se exploratory or self-adaptive
behaviour. Empowerment identifies only the ‘‘importance’’ of
system states and does not prescribe how to reach them. Obviously,
such a rule can be easily derived, e.g. by greedy action selection, as
in the cart-pole system. However, to actually compute this, this
requires a more or less sophisticated world model. Since the
present paper studies empowerment from a proof-of-principle
perspective, it is not currently preoccupied with a efficient ways of
implementing the model (which are explored in separate work),
but rather with identifying the general and fundamental principles
at work and whether it makes sense to consider empowerment as a
universal utility.
In a variety of scenarios highlighting different aspects of possible
agent worlds, we have seen that empowerment identifies intuitively
Figure 9. n-step empowerment as the maximum information flow from the actions At, . . . ,Atzn{1f g:Ant to a sensory input variable St’
at time step t’wt. The maximization occurs over the joint distribution of the actions (indicated by the common parent Zt). The sensor input that the
agent itself perceives later is shown in the top row of the diagram as it is detached from the action selection used for empowerment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004018.g009
Figure 8. Perception-action loop as a Bayesian network. S –
state of the sensor, A – action performed by the actuator, M – state of
the memory of the controller, R – state of the rest of the agent-
environment system. The diagram can be read as follows: action At is
picked given sensor state St and memory state Mt, sensor state St is
obtained from the state of the rest of the agent-environment system Rt ,
and Rtz1 is obtained from Rt and At.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004018.g008
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‘‘interesting’’ aspects. Previous work has shown that empowerment
identifies states which increase options e.g. by allowing the
manipulation of a box or finding areas in mazes or worlds which
strongly correlate with hand-selected performance measures
[40,66].
In the sensor evolution model, empowerment provided a model
for the emergence of qualitatively different sensors (blob vs. arc),
depending on the state (‘‘niche’’) of the agent. Especially important
was the cart-pole example in which empowerment provides the
system with a natural ‘‘pole-upright’’ homeostatic dynamics
without having to specify this explicitly as a task. In particular,
while a greedy empowerment maximization was determined
locally for each state, it nevertheless resulted in a global
homeostatic behaviour. There are some indications that this
property generalizes to other scenarios. In the AIBO experiment,
we showed that empowerment induces a relevant context from
which an agent may be able to induce a subjective ‘‘meaning’’ for
certain aspects of the environment.
Importantly, in all these experiments empowerment was
virtually defined in the same way. Once the system, the agent,
its sensors and actuators as well as their resolution is fixed, then,
for a given time horizon, empowerment is determined in the
precisely same fashion.
It is not obvious that the states favoured by empowerment
should match the intuitive expectation of good states: the
consistent observation of this phenomenon requires discussion.
Of course, it is easy to design explicit counterexamples: for
instance, in the cart-pole system one could imagine the specific
task of having the pole drop to the right side. While this is
generally easy to achieve, and is an unchallenging task compared
to the upright pole balancing, it might be a valid system goal.
Note, however, that if the agent starts in a highly empowered state
(upright pole), one has no difficulties to bring the system to the
desired target of having the pole fall to the right, while the
converse is not true.
This principle of identifying generically advantageous initial
states is a general property of empowerment. So, while
empowerment does not need to be correlated with an explicitly
given goal, being in a maximally empowered state is a good a
priori guess for an initial state that maximizes the agents’ chances
of homing into a suddenly emerging goal. It identifies states which
allow the agent to ‘‘keep its options open’’.
This makes empowerment a particularly suitable candidate
measure to identify advantageous states in scenarios where the
agent has to sustain itself over time — it identifies states of
particular sustainability for a given environment and sensorimotor
equipment (this is analogous to the role of the free energy principle
for the brain from [19] which has been proposed, among other, to
prevent phase transitions deleterious to the system’s organization).
Such a setting, in turn, is highly relevant for biological systems and
could lead to understand how homeostatic variables can emerge
intrinsically in a biological system with a given sensorimotor
equipment. If biological adaptation would indeed aim at
maximizing sustainability over various time scales according to a
principle such as empowerment maximization, then it might be
possible that novel homeostatic variables could emerge from an
evolution of regulative processes that implement dynamics similar
to empowerment maximization. Thus, this could provide an
insight how the evolution of the rich set of homeostatic and
regulatory variables on all levels of living organisms is directed,
providing a powerful principle for biological self-organization.
It is unlikely to expect that a quantity such as empowerment is
measured and optimized directly in biology, i.e. that a strong
principle of empowerment maximization would hold. A weak form
of the principle, however, might be possible: analogously to the
optimized information transmission in neurons [67,17,16], over
time evolution might result in organisms that implement a suitable
informationally optimal dynamics, at least to some approximation.
In that case, quantities such as empowerment could provide
transparent insight into the selection pressures that guide the
emergence of successful information processing architectures on all
levels of biology.
The main free variable of the empowerment model is the
temporal horizon. Its depth determines not only the ‘‘foresight’’ of
the empowerment measure, but also to which extent one can
model the focusing on a target. As illustration, consider a predator
homing in on its prey: the predator’s short-term empowerment is
reduced due to its energy and time expenditure, however, on
successful capture and consumption of the prey, the predator’s
long-term empowerment is again increased as its life span is
prolonged and, hence, the predator’s potential to continue
carrying out actions in the future. More generally, if one considers
only sustainable systems (the ones typical to biology), then with a
sufficiently large temporal horizon the homing in on specific
targets is covered by the maximum empowerment principle.
As seen in the sensor evolution scenario, empowerment can
drive sensor and actuator ‘‘morphology’’ evolution. Since the
value of empowerment involves properties of both the actuators
and the sensors, it provides an immediate measure for the
efficiency of the perception-action loop and a direct gradient for
adaptation without requiring the achievement of specific life tasks
for the given organism. Of course, in general there will be
metabolic, bandwidth or morphological constraints, which can be
readily incorporated in the constraints on sensor and actuator
evolution. But, given such constraints, a quantity such as
empowerment provides an immediate gradient for the adaptation
or evolution of sensorimotor loops. The alternative would be
selection via survival, where the success of a particular sensori-
motor loop would be only determined after prolonged time and
thus would entail indirect and often significantly delayed feedback
concerning the performance of a given sensorimotor loop.
The simple principle of empowerment maximization together
with the size constraint on the sensor placement in the sensor
evolution scenario highlights further interesting aspects: the sensor
structure changes qualitatively, from a blob to an arc as the agent
moves from one ‘‘niche’’ to another. Thus even this simple model
provides an indication how the emergence of a rich variety of
biological sensors specifically adapted to their particular sensory
niche might be guided by some universal, for instance empower-
ment-like principle.
On the other hand, this scenario has been shown earlier to
exhibit much less selection pressure when actuators were evolved
[57]. In this case, many quite different, but equally empowered
designs were found. This was due to the fact that the actions were
selected freely by the agent (apart from bandwidth, there were no
restrictions on the actuators) and thus the actuators had more
freedom in producing their information than the sensors have in
extracting information from the environment. This can be loosely
interpreted in the way that information that can be produced by
the actuators of an agent is of a ‘‘higher quality’’ than that which
can be extracted by the sensors; the behaviour of an active agent
exhibits a signature. This leads, in turn, to a reduced selection
pressure during actuator evolution, as the agent can use the
significant control over its actions to compensate differences in
actuator setups. In the biological reality, however, actuators suffer
from very significant energetic and mechanical limitations and
costs. We thus expect that once these factors are included, these
will end up producing a significant additional selection pressure on
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the morphology and operation of actuators. On the other hand, if
substantial energetic or morphological constraints are absent, we
do indeed predict that the evolution of actuators under
empowerment will experience significantly less specific selection
pressures than the evolution of sensors.
The experiment with the AIBO robot shows that empowerment
is able to provide an agent with an intrinsic concept of relevant
features (contexts) in the environment. The context found from a
time series observed internally by the robot sensors matched well
the externally determined presence or absence of a book. For the
presence/absence of the book to be relevant to the robot, it has to
have an influence on the robot’s perception-action loop. In this
view, if the book is not perceived, but also if it does not modulate
the influence of the agent on the world, the context change is not
considered relevant to the agent.
Returning to the original question, we asked whether it is
possible to formulate universal utilities for (specifically biological)
agents. If it were possible, this could provide some both universal
and local guiding principle for the adaptation of biological systems.
We have seen above that there are a number of candidates for this.
The present paper, in particular, studies the suitability of
empowerment for that purpose.
Such a hypothesis requires a discussion why an evolutionary
process should at all, on the long run, end up with some universal
utility emerging to guide its direction. While the present paper
does not attempt to suggest a particular mechanism by which this
could be attained, in the case of empowerment we can propose
some hypothetical paths for the emergence of such a phenomenon.
Probably the most direct one can be discussed in the context of the
homeostatic effect mentioned earlier this section. A sustainable
system (as typical for biology) needs to be ‘‘prepared’’ for a certain
set of perturbations and needs to be able to counteract them with a
maximal probability of success. A measure such as empowerment
could then emerge as a result of this selection pressure. Note that
this implies that sensors that better identify the dangerous
perturbations, and actuators that better counteract them will then
also be favoured by the selection process. In other words, the a
priori structure of sensors and actuators could incorporate much of
the evolutionary ‘‘experience’’ of relevant perturbations, and an
agent’s life-time adaptation would then just fine-tune the balance
by maximizing e.g. empowerment or a related quantity.
Once equipped with certain sensorimotor properties, actions
which cannot be distinguished via the sensors, or sensory
modalities that cannot be affected by the actions at some time
scale are likely to degenerate away, as information processing is
energetically costly [12]. It thus makes sense to hypothesize that, in
an approximately stable equilibrium of evolution and individual
adaptation, an agent will be to some degree in a state of optimality
with respect to empowerment; the plasticity of the control
mechanism would lead the agent into a state where the actuators
can exploit the perceivable sensory bandwidth to the fullest.
Where not, one would expect the sensors to degenerate over
evolution if they do not provide a selective advantage or the
actuators to be enhanced if they do. One mechanism for this could
be the discovery of novel modes of actuation and manipulation
which provide the agent with additional degrees of freedom.
It should be noted that we say nothing about how empower-
ment would be computed by evolution or during the adaptation of
the concrete organism. In an artificial computational model one
can carry out explicit calculations of the quantities associated with
empowerment. However, in biology a phenomenon such as
empowerment maximization may originally play a guiding role in
the discovery of novel sensorimotor modalities, but may then, on
the long run, be effectively condensed over time into the form of
natural homeostatic drives such as hunger, pain avoidance, or
temperature regulation. In particular, the consideration of a
universal utility such as empowerment does not necessarily provide
us with a biological mechanism, but only with a principle. On the
other hand, attaining such a principle could be enormously
beneficial as it could be useful to make predictions, to guide our
search for the concrete underlying biological mechanisms or even
to help construct plausible biologically inspired artificial systems.
Information regarding Figures 8 and 9 can be found in the
Appendix S2 and S4.
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